ludzkie-ciekawostki: Hilary Putnam

Evidence: 53 • authority: 72

Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters—is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding. This can apply to items such as the physical world, the past and future, other minds, and t…

Evidence: 47 • authority: 72

In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct (or naïve) realism, as opposed to indirect (or representational) realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences. The debate arises out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our conscious experience. Indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm…

Evidence: 47 • authority: 92

Behavioral Pragmatism: Making A Place for Reality and Truth.. In "Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth," Barnes-Holmes (2000) proposed a behavior-analytic version of philosophical pragmatism he called behavioral pragmatism (BP), a perspective which challenges two bedrock tenets of Western culture: (1) metaphysical realism, the view that an external, physical reality exists which is mind-independent and (2) the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), a theory which maintains that true statements are those which correspond to mind-independent reality. Many (perhaps most) behavior analysts accept both of these tenets (though they typically name and describe these tenets using di…

Evidence: 42 • authority: 92

Realism and the point at infinity: The end of the line?. Philosophers of mathematics often rely on the historical progress of mathematics in support of mathematical realism. These histories typically build on formal semantic tools to evaluate the changes in mathematics, and on these bases present later mathematical concepts as refined versions of earlier concepts which are taken to be vague. Claiming that this view does not apply to mathematical concepts in general, we present a case-study concerning projective geometry, for which we apply the tools of cognitive linguistics to analyse the developmental trajectory of the domain. On the basis of this analysis, we argue for the existence of tw…

Evidence: 42 • authority: 72

In philosophy of perception and epistemology, naïve realism (often associated with direct (perceptual) realism, itself metaphysically complemented by manifest realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are. When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism. According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves. The naïve realist is typically also a metaphysical realist, holding that these objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all of their properties regardless of whether or not ther…

Evidence: 42 • authority: 72

Modal realism is the view propounded by the philosopher David Lewis that all possible worlds are real in the same way as is the actual world: they are "of a kind with this world of ours." It states that possible worlds exist, possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world, possible worlds are irreducible entities, and the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now". Extended modal realism is a form of modal realism that involves ontological commitments not just to possible worlds but also to impossible worlds. Objects are conceived as being s…

Evidence: 42 • authority: 72

Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 – March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician, computer scientist, and figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He contributed to the studies of philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. Outside philosophy, Putnam contributed to mathematics and computer science. Together with Martin Davis he developed the Davis–Putnam algorithm for the Boolean satisfiability problem and he helped demonstrate the unsolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem. Putnam applied equal scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to r…

Evidence: 36 • authority: 72

Entity realism (sometimes equated with referential realism) is a philosophical position within the debate about scientific realism. It is a variation of realism (originally proposed by Stanford School philosophers Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking in 1983) that restricts warranted belief to only certain entities.