zwierzęta: Nihilism

Evidence: 82 • authority: 88

Mereological Nihilism: Keeping It Simple. (Mereological) nihilism states that there are no composite objects—there are only sub-atomic particles such as quarks. Nihilism’s biggest rival, (mereological) universalism, posits vast numbers of composite objects in addition to the sub-atomic particles, and so nihilism appears to be the more ontologically parsimonious of the two theories. If this is the case, it’s a significant result for the nihilist: ontological parsimony is almost always thought to be a theoretical virtue, so a nihilist victory in the parsimony stakes gives us a defeasible reason to be nihilists. But things aren’t so straightforward. Karen Bennett (2009) has argued that nihilis…

Evidence: 61 • authority: 72

In philosophy, mereological nihilism (also called compositional nihilism) is the metaphysical thesis that there are no objects with proper parts. Equivalently, mereological nihilism says that mereological simples, or objects without any proper parts, are the only material objects that exist. Mereological nihilism is a form of nihilism as it denies a metaphysical assumption about reality, that is, the existence of composite objects.

Evidence: 54 • authority: 72

Nihilism is a family of philosophical views that reject the existence of any objectively meaningful purpose, moral value, truth, knowledge, or related concepts. Nihilistic views span several branches of philosophy, including ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. Nihilism is also described as a broad cultural phenomenon or historical movement that pervades modernity in the Western world. Existential nihilism asserts that life has no objective meaning or purpose. The idea that all individual and societal values are ultimately pointless has been associated with various responses. They range from general indifference and existential crises to transformative reinterpretations of e…

Evidence: 47 • authority: 92

When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition.. Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restr…

Evidence: 47 • authority: 92

Mereological Anti-Conservatism.. In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed "Mereological Anti-Conservatism." This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories-Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of c…

Evidence: 47 • authority: 88

Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects. Abstract Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist.

Evidence: 45 • authority: 88

Ordinary Objects as Mereological Sums. Abstract The thesis that ordinary material objects are mereological sums in the standard sense has been remarkably popular among three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists alike. This chapter considers two prominent representatives: Judith Jarvis Thomson, for the three-dimensionalist camp; and David Lewis, for the four-dimensionalist camp. The question of why Thomson's temporalized and modalized version of standard mereology still does not adequately capture the characteristics of ordinary material objects is postponed until Chapter 4. The remainder of the chapter considers Lewis' argument in favor of Unrestricted Composition, in particular in the…

Evidence: 45 • authority: 80

Do We Exist? Mereological Nihilism, Collective Thinking and Dualism

Evidence: 45 • authority: 92

Beyond symbolic algebra with quantum picturalism.. The more advanced the symbolic mathematics, the more impenetrable the meaning. This is particularly evident in quantum theory, where symbolic formalisms foreground states and objects. An alternative diagrammatic approach, Quantum Picturalism (QPic), privileges structure, relation, and transformation. As a category theoretic formalism, it supports reasoning through the composition of visually represented quantum processes, a distinction that not only concerns representation but also shapes how quantum phenomena are conceptualized, opening new educational possibilities and ways of knowing. The choice of formalism-algebraic or diagrammatic-is…

Evidence: 45 • authority: 72

An entity is something that exists. In its broadest sense, the concept is the most general category of being and encompasses anything that is identifiable, including living beings, inanimate objects, places, events, ideas, numbers, properties, and relations. It is controversial whether empty space and absences, such as holes or shadows, are also entities or should be regarded as nonentities. The words object, thing, and being are often treated as synonyms for entity, but they have distinct connotations and are not always interchangeable. Various fundamental types of entities have been proposed, but it is disputed whether they are all part of reality. Particulars are individual, nonrepeatabl…

Evidence: 39 • authority: 80

Mereological Nihilism and Simple Substance in Leibniz