zwierzęta: Hard problem of consciousness

Evidence: 100 • authority: 72

In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness (or simply the hard problem) is to explain how and why organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give rise to the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioural functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioural—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference…

Evidence: 45 • authority: 72

Illusionism is a family of views in philosophy of mind according to which phenomenal consciousness is an illusion that either does not exist or is a misrepresentation of real neural processes. Closely related to eliminative materialism, it is a form of materialism or physicalism as it argues that consciousness is determined entirely by the physical world, as opposed to mind–body dualism, which argues that the mind and body are separate. It is also related to Michael Graziano's attention schema theory (AST) in cognitive neuroscience, which considers the brain to be an information processing device that gathers information about its own attention into an internal model of reality which it the…

Evidence: 41 • authority: 92

Holographic Duality and the Physics of Consciousness.. This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic "phenomenal character". Providing such top…

Evidence: 38 • authority: 88

A systematic approach to answering the easy problems of consciousness based on an executable cognitive system. Consciousness is the window of the brain and reflects many fundamental cognitive properties involving both computational and cognitive mechanisms. A collection of these properties was described as the "easy problems" by Chalmers, including the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to stimuli; information integration; reportability; information access; attention; deliberate control; and the difference between wakefulness and sleep. These "easy problems" have not been systematically addressed. This study presents a first attempt to address them systematically based on an exe…

Evidence: 38 • authority: 92

Life and experience as irreducible dimensions of nature.. Space and time are irreducible dimensions of nature-measurable but not derivable from anything more fundamental. Life and experience are here proposed as similarly irreducible dimensions. Together-sometimes referred to as lifeexperience to mark their inseparability-they constitute the dimensional ground from which emerges the Force of Experience-proposed as a candidate fifth fundamental force requiring further physical specification-whose causal reality is evidenced by the entirety of human civilization and all its products, for good and ill. Physics has failed to explain consciousness and life because it treats them as phenomena to…

Evidence: 35 • authority: 80

From Functional Analysis to Mechanistic Explanation