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koty: The Conscious Mind

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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory was published in 1996, and is the first book written by David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher specialising in philosophy of mind.
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory was published in 1996, and is the first book written by David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher specialising in philosophy of mind. Although the book has been greatly influential, Chalmers maintains that it is "far from perfect", as most of it was written as part of his PhD dissertation after "studying philosophy for only four years".
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Notatka fact-checku: Fact-check 3.0-content-aware: no sufficient claim-bound corroboration after 3 healthy attempts. Scope=verify the factual claim. Required independent sources=2; stored evidence groups=1. Provider/API errors did not consume attempts. | Fact-check 4.3.2: research wznowiony bez zdejmowania HOLD. Poprzednia metoda: factcheck-300-content-aware. | Fact-check 4.3.2: research wznowiony bez zdejmowania HOLD. Poprzednia metoda: factcheck-weekly-research-432.

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Wikipedia ENPOTWIERDZAniezależne

Evidence: 100 • authority: 72

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory was published in 1996, and is the first book written by David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher specialising in philosophy of mind. Although the book has been greatly influential, Chalmers maintains that it is "far from perfect", as most of it was written as part of his PhD dissertation after "studying philosophy for only four years".

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Elsevier BVpomocniczeniezależne

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University of Chicago Presspomocniczeniezależne

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Wikipedia ENpomocnicze

Evidence: 45 • authority: 72

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Wikipedia ENpomocnicze

Evidence: 45 • authority: 72

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Wikipedia ENpomocnicze

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In philosophy of mind, a philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment that is physically identical to a normal human being but has no phenomenal experience. For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would feel no pain, but would react just as a conscious human would. In other words, the being has full access consciousness but no phenomenal consciousness. The philosophical zombie is used in thought experiments about whether consciousness can be completely explained by facts about the brain and body. Philosophical zombie arguments are used against forms of physicalism and in defense of the hard problem of consciousness, which is the p…

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Wikipedia ENpomocnicze

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David John Chalmers (; born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist, specializing in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York University (NYU), as well as co-director of NYU's Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness (along with Ned Block). In 2006, he was elected a fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. In 2013, he was elected as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Chalmers is best known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness, and for popularizing the philosophical zombie thought experiment. Chalmers and David Bourget co-founded PhilPapers; a database…

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American Library Associationpomocniczeniezależne

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Europe PMC / Frontiers in cognitionpomocniczeniezależne

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Representationalism can connect neuroscience and philosophy.. Representationalism is the theory that our conscious perception of the world is mediated by mental representations, rather than being a direct encounter with reality. In this article, we define representations in terms of a unified theory of long-term memory that incorporates both its explicit and implicit divisions. Apart from these integrative features, the theory offers the possibility for reconciling perspectives in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind. We address various areas of debate, focusing on concepts such as consciousness, intentionality, emergence, and qualia. We draw the following conclusions based on our framew…

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JSTORpomocniczeniezależne

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JSTORpomocniczeniezależne

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Europe PMC / Medicine, health care, and philosophypomocniczeniezależne

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